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I. INTRODUCTION
Japan, with a population exceeding 125,000,000 people,1 has historically
banned all rice importation into its internal agricultural market! This exceptionally strict protection of its internal rice market is an effective method that
Japan has relied upon to promote the expansion and prevent the degradation of
indigenous rice production and ensure reasonable income to rice producers.3 The

I.
2.

T1 WoRw ALMANAC AND BOOK OFFACTS 789 (Robert Famighetti ed. 1994).
MrrsuoMAsUSH1TA,INRNATiONALTRADEAND COMPETrIONLAWINJAPAN47 (1993); Thomas

J.Schoenbaum,AgriculturalTrade Wars:A Threat to GATTand Global FreeTrade, 24ST. MARY's W. 1165,
1180(1993).
3.
See MATSUSHiTA, supra note 2, at 47 (descnbing through a broad analysis that the Japanese
government, through laws specific to rice, has used import bans on rice to help meet the policy requirements
of increasing rice production and maintaining rice producer income mandated under the Agricultural Basic

Law).
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increase of agricultural productivity and the maintenance of the income of those
engaged in agriculture are specific goals that the government must meet under
government objectives set out in Japan's Agricultural Basic Law.4

In 1987, the United States, in an effort to pressure the Japanese government
into opening Japan's agricultural market, filed a formal complaint with the Con-

tracting Parties 5 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI), 6 highlighting Japan's protectionist policies on several agricultural products, including

rice.7 The GATT panel found that Japan's quotas on these agricultural products,

including the rice quotas, violated Article Xl of the GATr. The Japanese

government, under pressure from the United States, agreed to modify the quotas
affecting the majority of the agricultural products highlighted, but refused to compromise on its rice policy. 9 Japan's unwillingness to cooperate and modify its rice
policy sparked heavy protest from the U.S. Rice Miller's Association and
increased efforts by the United States to convince Japan to open its rice market.'0
It was not until December 13, 1993, that Japan, under extreme international and

U.S. pressure, made concessions in the final moments of the GATT Uruguay
Round negotiations and accepted the Denis minimum access agreement that provides for gradual liberalization of Japan's internal rice market."
4.
See generally Nogyo Kihon Ho,Law No. 127 of 1961, ch. I, art1, 1961 (describing the intent and
theory behind the general provision of the Agricultural Basic Law)[hereinafter Agricultural Basic Law].
5. See generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, art.
XXV, 61 stat., part 5, ASI, T.I.A.S. 1700, reprintedin Ttr
o"TH GENE
A L AGREEme aON TARIFFS
ANDTRADE, July 1986 [hereinafter GATI'] (defining Contracting Parties as the representatives of the member
countries of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade when meeting jointly as a committee).
6.
See GATT-GUIDE accessed on the INTERNET through the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, Tufts University (explaining that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as first signed in
1947 was designed to provide an international forum to encourage free trade and resolve disputes between
contracting countries which now number over 110).
7.
See MrrSUo MASUSHITA & THOMAS J.SCHOENBAUM, JAPANESE INTERNATiONAL TRADE AND
INVESTmENT LAW 76 (1989) (discussing the complaint filed by the United States regarding Japan's quotas
regarding importation of dairy products, beef, pork, fiuit
puree, pineapple, non-citrus and tomato juice, tomato
ketchup, starch, glucose and miscellaneous processed foods); MATsusHiTA, supra note 2, at 180; Schoenbaum,
supranote 2, at 1171.
8.
See MATSUSHITA & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 7, at 76 (discussing the GATT panel decision);
MATSUSHMTA, supranote 2, at 180; Schoenbaum, supranote 2,at 1171.
9.
MATSUSHtrrA, supranote 2, at 181 (discussing Japan's response to the GATF panel decision).
10. See MATSUSMITA & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 7, at 77 (explaining that Japan's refusal to
compromise on its rice policy resulted in the filing of a formal petition by the U.S. Rice Miller's Association,
under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, demanding trade retaliation against Japan which the United States
said it would consider if Japan did not take steps to open its rice market); see John Burgess, Rice Trade Dispute
is Boiling Up; JapanResisting U.S. Efforts to Open Its Market to Imports, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1986, at GI
(discussing the U.S. Rice Miller's Association's filing of a complaint and their allegations that the import ban
on rice is unfair trade and must stop or face U.S. retaliation)
11. HosokawaAnnouncesDecision To Open Japan To Rice Imports, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), Dec. 15,
1993, at 2082; see Anthony Rowley, Keeping Those Rice Bowls Filled,Bus. TuMES, Oct. 13, 1993, at 29
(discussing the demands made by Japan's GATT partner countries to replace import bans and quotas with
tariffs on all products including rice); Teresa Watanabe, JapaneseLawmakers ProtestRice Policy Changes,
L.A.Tmos, Dec. 1, 1993, at DI (explaining that Japan was under extreme international pressure to lift its rice
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Since accepting the Denis plan, Japan has taken major steps to liberilize its
rice market' 2 Those steps include legal reforms to the laws through which the
traditional rice ban has been enforced.' 3 Leading rice exporting countries are now
positioning themselves to take advantage of what they hope will be a tremendous

market for foreign rice.'4
This Comment examines Japan's traditional rice importation policy and the
potential impact that the Denis minimum access plan' 5 which opens Japan's
internal rice market, may have on Japan's rice policies as well as the international
rice trade. Part II focuses on the policies that have influenced Japan's strict

regulation of its internal rice market.1 6 Part I examines Japan's rice import law
and the policies of the Agricultural Basic Law and the Foodstuff Control Law that
lead to the GAT conflict.1 7 Part IV discusses and explains how Japan's laws
governing rice imports conflicted with Article XI of the GAIT.' 8 Part V analyzes
the Denis minimum access plan that Japan hesitantly accepted at the Uruguay

Round.19 Part VI addresses recent changes Japan has made in its rice laws. 2° Part
VII discusses how the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture and Japan's
recent law changes will effect rice exporters attempting to access the Japanese
rice market.21 Part VIfI concludes that Japan has made tremendous strides to open
its rice market and that the U.S. rice exporters and producers can expect to
prosper by this action, but only to the extent that Japan allows free market forces

to truly liberalize its market.

ban); see infra notes 111-116 and accompanying text (explaining the details of the Denis minimum access
agreement).
12. See Hosokawa Announces DecisionTo Open JapanTo Rice Imports, supra note 11. at 2082; T.R.
Reid, JapanEnds Ban on Rice Imports; Coalition Government Acts on Brink of Deadlinefor Trade Talks,
WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 1993, at A19; David Holley, Rice No LongerEqualsLife in Japan;GradualOpening

of the Market Seals the Fateof the TraditionalSystem, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1994, at World Report 8.
13. See generally JAPAN INTERNATIONAL AGRicuLTtJRAL COUNCIi. FOR THE FOOD AGENCY, AN
OLLmiNEFORTHESTABILIzA'roNOFSUPPLY-DEAND AND PRICE OFSTAPLEFOOD I (1995)(explaining that

Japan has abolished earlier law and enacted new law in an attempt to conform its traditional policies on rice
to new international trade rules).
14. Telephone Interview with MathewJ. Massaua, Regional Director of International Policy and Market
Development, U.S.A. Rice Federation (Dec. 19, 1995) (explaining that Australia, China, Thailand, Pakistan,
Uruguay and the United States are among those countries actively pursuing contracts with Japan to import rice
as Japan is required to do under the Denis minimum access plan).
15. See generallyJapan to Allow Rice Imports, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2077 (Dee. 15, 1993) (showing
that the plan accepted by Japan's Prime Minister Mirihiro Hosokawa is generally referred to or known as the
Denis minimum access plan).
16. See infra notes 23-48 and accompanying text.
17. See infranotes 49-90 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 91-109 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 110-22 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 123-44 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 145-65 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
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II. INFLUENCES THAT HAVE SHAPED JAPAN'S RICE IMPORT LAW
A.

CulturalInfluences

Rice plays a significant role in the Japanese culture and has done so since the
initial development of Japanese culture.8 The earliest pottery and sites of
Japanese culture discovered in Northern Kyushu have yielded marks of rice husks
and carbonized rice? 4 Japan's original settlements also reveal evidence of rice

paddy fields, advanced irrigation systems required for the wet cultivation of rice,
and raised floor structures used for rice storage?
Not only do the earliest settlements of Japan show evidence of rice playing

an important role as a key source of food, but throughout Japan's history rice has
also been an indicator of wealth? 6 For example, in Japanese Feudal society, the

revenues of rice and not the direct ownership of land determined power in early
Japan.2 7 In addition, throughout Japan's history, taxes have been collected in the
form of rice?8 Rice has also been used as a method of payment to control and

appease political forces.29
Several authorities attribute Japan's societal contours of cooperation to the
influences of rice cultivationo Many traditional events and ceremonies can be
traced to rice cultivation and it is well documented that rice plays a central role

in Japanese religious ceremonies.31 Further evidence indicating how deeply rice
is entrenched in the Japanese culture is that gohan, the word commonly32 used in

Japan to signify "meal," is actually the Japanese word for cooked rice.

23. 22 TaE NEW ENcycaOnpmrA BRITANNICA, MACROPAEDIA, KNOWLEDGE INDEPr 277 (15th ed.)
(1993).
24. Id.
25. See id. (describing how early Japanese settlements were designed while taking into account
strategies that would aid in rice cultivation).
26. E.H.NoRMAN, ORIGINS OFTHEMODERNJAPANESESTATE 119 n.1 (John W. Dower ed. 1975).
27. See id. (explaining that while land in many societies determines wealth, it was the ownership of rice
that was the determinant factor relating to power in early Japan).
28. ImENEWENCYCLOPEDIA BRrrANNICA, supranote 23, at 293.
29. See id (explaining the importance of rice not only as a food source but as a valuable instrument of
barter and payment).
30. See Kevin Rafferty, DeadlineforGAT JapanLifts the Lid On Rice Imports,THE GUARDIAN, Dec.
13, 1993, at 14 (discussing the tremendous social influence that rice cultivation has had on Japan's societal
traits); see Holley, supra note 12, at World Report 8 (explaining that rice cultivation has been credited with
developing the cooperation that is at the foundation of Japanese society).
31. See Joseph LaPenta, Japan's Food of the Gods, THE DAILY YoMIRI, Nov. 28, 1993, at 7
(explaining that rice is involved in many Japanese religious ceremonies and that in the view on ancient
Japanese cosmology every grain ofrice is sacred); see Reid, supranote 12, at A19 (stating rice is central to
Japan's religion).
32. See EDwIN O.RmscSHAUER,THEJAPANEsETo DAY2I (1988) (stating that rice is such a fundamental
part of the Japanese diet that the Japanese word for rice has become synonymous with the word "meal" in
Japan).
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B. PublicPolicy Influences
In Japan, the agricultural sector has traditionally employed a relatively large

percentage of the working population. 33 Because rice farming in Japan continues
to be done primarily on small family-owned farms, it remains an extremely laborintensive and inefficient operation that employs a relatively large segment of the
unskilled labor in Japan, particularly in the rural villages.3 Maintaining employ-

ment income flow into this fanning sector and preventing the demise of Japan's
rural fanning villages is one of the policies that justifies Japan's
tight price con35

trol and overall market regulation and protection of rice.
Another primary public policy justification for Japan's tight control of its rice
market is based on a "food security" rational.3 6 Because rice is a basic staple of
the Japanese diet, the Japanese government is opposed to relying on foreign
suppliers and potentially becoming politically vulnerable to those rice supplying

countries? 7 The result is that many in Japan believe that their country is put in a
stronger position by maintaining strict regulation of internal rice markets rather
than risking foreign rice dependence s
An additional public policy reason stated by Japan in support of its ban on

rice imports is related to Japan's dependence on foreign food imports and its

33. T ENEENCYcLOPmABRA NTCA,supranote 23, at 269; see Holley, supranote 12, at World
Report 8 (explaining that the agricultural sector employed over 41% of the population in 1955).
34. See RE sCHAum, supra note 32, at 302; TIE NEw F-NCYCLOPEDIA BRiTANNICA, supra note 23. at
269 (explaining that rice dominates Japan's agricultural industry and the vast majority of its agricultural
resources are devoted to rice cultivation); see Holley, supra note 12, at World Report 8 (explaining that
although the agricultural sector has dropped regarding overall percentage of Japan's population it employs, it
continues to employ close to 13% ofJapan's population).
35. See Holley, supranote 12, at World Report 8 (explaining that the rice import ban, by maintaining
income flow into the rural farming sector, is credited with the economic stabilization and preservation of
Japan's farming regions).
36. See Burgess, supra note 10, at GI (explaining that self-sufficiency in rice production is one way
to protect Japanese interests regarding proper maintenance of the national food supply and protect against trade
embargos); see also John M. Green, Agriculture,in THE GAIT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY
(1986-1992) 152 (rerence P. Stewart, ed., 1993) (giving Japan's general position regarding food security and
the rice import ban); see also Ronald E. Yates, Economic MiracleFailsto Materializeon JapaneseFans
CHI. TanB,, Sept. 21, 1986, at Bus. 1 (stating that Japan is very concerned with food security and does not want
to be dependant on foreign suppliers for its food).
37. See Schoenbaum, supranote 2, at 1180; Yates, supranote 36, at Bus. I (stating that the Japanese
intense focus on food security is a result of the World War H embargos and naval blockades that resulted in
severe Japanese food shortages); Burgess, supranote 10, at G1 (pointing out that Japan remembers the United
States' soybean embargo and does not want to experience a similar situation with rice).
38. See LaPenta, supra note 31, at 7 (describing a common argument against allowing rice importation
that emphasizes Japan's need to be self-sufficient in its staple food production); see generally Schoenbaum,
supranote 2, at 1180 (implying that because rice is an important staple in the Japanese diet that Japan cannot
afford to compromise its position, either politically or from a national standpoint, by becoming dependent on
foreign rice suppliers).

277

The TransnationalLawyerVoL 9

position as the world's largest net importer of food.39 Given its unenviable
dependence on food imports, Japan justifies its ban on rice importation by

pointing out that rice is the sole commodity that it is capable of producing in
quantities large enough to achieve self-sufficiency and reduce overall reliance on

imports.4' Furthermore, it is only through the ban on rice imports that Japan can
achieve and maintain that self-sufficiency.!1
C. PoliticalInfluences
Another major influence on Japan's rice laws comes from tremendous

political pressure on Japan's government to maintain the strict policies that
protect its internal rice market from foreign competition. 42 Since 1955, the ruling
political party in Japan has been the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). 3 The LDP
obtains a disproportionate amount of its power from the support of farmers and
rural voters."4 Unquestionably, Japan's principal crop is rice; 45 thus, the rice im-

port ban is deeply entrenched in Japan's political system:' Any attempt to
liberalize restrictions on rice imports creates an uproar among the farmers who
in turn voice concern within the Liberal Democratic Party."7 The potential for

39. See Burgess, supranote 10, at GI (explaining that Japan imports over half of its citizen's total
caloric intake and in 1985 singlehandedly purchased 25% of all U.S. corn exports, 13% of all U.S. wheat
exports, 26% of all U.S. soybean exports and 78% of all U.S. beef exports).
40. See MATSUSHTm, supranote 2, at 47 (describing reasons Japan asserts in defense of its ban on rice
imports and implying that rice is the only commodity Japan's agricultural sector can produce in quantities to
attain self-sufficiency).
.
41. See Burgess, supranote 10, at GI (giving Japan's rice import ban credit for saving Japan's rice
farming sector); see also Holley, supranote 12, at World Report 8 (implying that the survival of rice farming
in Japan is tied to the rural fanning villages and these villages survive in great part due to the rice import ban
and the protection it affords them from foreign competition).
42. See Reid, supranote 12, at A19 (pointing out the tremendous political challenges to reforming the
protectionist rice import policies); see Oswald Johnston, Rice Growers Pushfor Japan to Open Market;
Formal ComplaintAsks U.S. to Insistthat ImportRestrictions Be Eased, L.A.TIMEs, Sept. 15, 1988, at Bus.
I (implying that Japanese rice farmers are politically powerful and have been successful for years in convincing
the government to protect them from foreign competition).

43. Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 1181; see Rafferty, supranote 30, at 14 (stating that the Liberal
Democratic Party had ruled unchallenged in Japan since 1955, until recent challenges in 1993).
44. See Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 1181 (discussing the important position of farmers and rural
voters in the LDP power base); Rafferty, supranote 30, at 14 (stating that the LDP used a political platform
including high rice prices to obtain the support of farmers which helped the LDP rule Japanese politics for
decades).
45. THENEwENCYCLOPEDIABRITANmc,supranote 23, at 269.
46. See Burgess, supranote 10, at 31 (explaining that very few countries have an institution so deeply
entrenched in the political and economic system as Japan does with its rice import ban).
47. See Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 1181 (explaining that attempts to liberalize the rice import
restrictions would lead to mass demonstrations by the farmers and rural voters.).
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such political disaster weighs heavy in the political arena and has effectively

discouraged liberalization of rice restrictions."
III. JAPAN'S RICE IMPORT LAW THAT LEAD TO THE GATr CONFLICr

A. The AgriculturalBasic Law
In Japan, the Agricultural Basic Law49provides the general framework for the

implementation of agricultural policiesO The law was enacted in 1961 as a
response to Japan's recognition of the difficulties facing Japanese agriculture due

to the disparity between Japan's industrial and agricultural sectors, particularly
in productivity and worker standard of living5 l As a result of this disparity, the

viability of Japan's agricultural sector was jeopardized by the movement of the
agricultural labor force to nonagricultural occupations.52 The purpose behind the

Agricultural Basic Law was to remedy the widening gap between agriculture and
industry. 53 This goal could be achieved through aggressive promotion, moderni-

zation, and control of the agricultural markets in order to ensure that those
involved in agriculture can earn greater incomes which will enable them to make
a living comparable to those engaged in other industries and provide incentive to

remain in the agricultural sector!4 It is clear, based on the purpose behind the
Agricultural Basic Law, that the Japanese government believes maintaining the

viability of the agricultural industry, which contributes greatly not only to the
national economy but to the stability of national life as the supplier of the nation's

48. See Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 1181 (recognizing that attempts to liberalize the rice import
restrictions would cause major problems within the LDP party which depends on the farmers and rural voters
support to maintain its power base and political position in Japanese politics); see also Green, supranote 37,
at 153-54 (implying that farmers are a well organized political group in Japan and that they have a
proportionally larger voice in political matters because rural representation did not decline despite large-scale
migration from rural to urban areas); see also Rafferty, supranote 30, at 14 (implying that backing away from
a firm stance in support of maintaining the rice import ban would significantly damage the LDP's power base).
49. Agricultural Basic Law, supranote 4.
50. MATSUSHITA, supranote 2, at 47; see generallyAgricultural Basic Law.
5I. Green, supra note 36, at 152; see MATSUSHITA, supra note 2; Agricultural Basic Law, supranote
4. at Preamble (describing the purposes and policies behind the Agricultural Basic Law).
52. See generally Agricultural Basic Law, supra note 4, at Preamble (describing some of the changes
associated with the growing disparity between industry and agriculture).
53. See MATSUSHITA, supranote 2, at 46 (describing the purpose of the Agricultural Basic Law); see
also Agricultural Basic Law, supranote 4, at Preamble and art. 1 (explaining the objectives of the Agricultural
Basic Law); see also Green, supranote 36, at 152 (discussing the fundamental goals of the Agricultural Basic

Law).
54. See Agricultural Basic Law, supranote 4, at Preamble and art. 1 (giving a general overview of how
the government will narrow the gap between industry and agriculture).
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food and other important agricultural commodities, is important to Japan's overall
national well-being.5 5
The Agricultural Basic Law specifically outlines eight measures that the
government, in order to obtain the objectives of the law, shall attempt to further
when implementing any and all government policies.5The first of these measures
mandates that government policies promote the selective expansion of those
agricultural products with growth potential, while curtailing production of other
agricultural commodities that are experiencing decreases in demand. 57The second
measure requires the government to raise agricultural productivity and increase
gross output through effective land and water resource management as well as
through the effective utilization and exploitation of new agricultural technology.58
Third, the Japanese government must modernize farm business through the
enlargement of farm size, regrouping of farm land and the mechanization of
farming in order to improve the overall agricultural structure.5 9 The fourth
measure mandates government management of agricultural marketing and land
demand for production of agricultural commoditieso Measure five focuses
government attention on stabilizing prices of agricultural commodities and
improving agricultural income in order to offset the disadvantages of agriculture
inherent in the conditions of production and terms of trade.61 Measure six
emphdsis that government attention be placed on the stabilization of prices as well
as production and marketing of agricultural tools and supplies.6 2 The seventh
measure mandates that necessary steps be taken to train and maintain those
capable of managing farm businesses as well as employ solutions to enable those
engaged in agriculture to maintain and find employment according to their desires
and abilities.6 The final measure requires government intervention to improve the
quality of life of those involved in agriculture through amelioration of environmental conditions, such as traffic and sanitation, that will help improve life in
rural communities.6
Not only does the Agriculture Basic Law set out these measures that the
government must incorporate into its policies, it also grants the government

55. See id at Preamble (stating the importance that the agricultural sector has played in the development
of the national economy, stabilization of the Japanese food supply, conservation of national land and expansion
of domestic markets).
56. See idart. 2 (specifically listing the eight measures set forth in the Agricultural Basic Law); see also
MATSUSHrTA, supra note 2, at 46 (listing the specific means to be used under Chapter 1, art. 2 of the
Agricultural Basic Law).
57. Agricultural Basic Law, supranote 4, art. 2, § 1; MATsJSHrrA, supranote 2, at 46.
58. Agricultural Basic Law, supranote 4, art. 2, § 2; MATSUSHTA, supranote 2, at 46.

59.
60.
61.
62.

Agricultural Basic Law, supranote 4, art. 2, § 3; MATSUSHITA, supranote 2, at 46.
Agricultural Basic Law, supranote 4, art. 2, § 4; MASUSHrrA, supranote 2, at 46.
Agricultural Basic Law, supranote 4, art. 2, § 5; MATSUSHITA, supranote 2, at 46.
Agricultural Basic Law, supranote 4, art. 2, § 6; MATSusmTA, supranote 2, at 46.

63.
64.

Agricultural Basic Law, supranote 4, art. 2, § 7; MATSUSHrA, supranote 2, at 46.
Agricultural Basic Law, supra note 4, art. 2, § 8; MAmsuSHTA, supranote 2, at 46.
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power to take whatever legal and financial steps it needs to follow through on
implementing these measures.0 In addition, the Agricultural Basic Law states that
the government, with respect to any important agricultural commodity, shall
directly take any necessary measure to stabilize prices of such a commodity
Furthermore, this law provides that the government shall take necessary measures
to restrain imports of agricultural products that are depressing the prices of those
products through competition and may, as a result, impact internal Japanese
production of that agricultural product.6 ' Thus, the Japanese government retains
enormous power to meet its obligation of improving agricultural income and
building the agricultural sector through price stabilization of agricultural commodities while adhering to the policies mandated by the Agricultural Basic Law. 6
B. The FoodstuffControlLaw
The measures and objectives of the Agricultural Basic Law apply to Japan's
agricultural industry in general, and it is through more specific laws tailored to
particular segments of the agricultural sector that Japan has actually effectuated
these measures.69 For instance, the Foodstuff Control Law 7° was one of the conduits through which the policies and measures of the Agricultural Basic Law have
been applied to grains 7 '
For decades, the Foodstuff Control Law helped stabilize prices and maintain
the income of those engaged in farming rice, wheat and barley by restricting the
importation of these commodities into Japan. 2
The purpose of the Foodstuff Control Law was to control the price, supply,
demand and distribution of rice in order to secure stable supplies of rice for
Japanese consumers and ensure stability of the national economy. 3 As a means

65. Agricultural Basic Law, supra note 4, art. 4.
66. Id. art. 11; MATSUSHITA, supranote 2, at47.
67. Agricultural Basic Law, supranote 4, art. 13; see MATSUSHrA, supranote 2, at 47 (discussing that
the government, under Article 13 of the Agricultural Basic Law, should employ increased tariffs or strict
import quotas to protect important agricultural products from foreign competition when key commodity prices
are depressed); MATSusHrrA & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 7, at 74 (explaining Article 13 of the Agricultural
Basic Law).
68. See generallyAgricultural Basic Law, supranote 4, art. 5, § 2 (requiring the government to stabilize
agricultural commodities and improve farming income to offset inherent farming disadvantages in production
and trade); i.art. 11 (giving the Japanese government full flexibility to take whatever steps may be necessary
to stabilize the price of agricultural products).
69. See generallyMATSUSHITA, supra note 2, at 47 (explaining that the policies of the Agricultural
Basic Law are put into effect through more specific laws).
70. Shokuryo Kanri Ho. Law No. 40 of 1942, as translated by the NHK Cultural Center in 1983
[hereinafter Foodstuff Control Law].
71. See generally MATSUSHITA,supranote 2, at 47 (discussing the means through which the policies
of the Agricultural Basic Law are effectuated).
72.

See Holley, supranote 12. at World Report 8; MATSUSHITA &SCHOENBAUM, supra note 7, at 75.

73. Foodstuff Control Law, supranote 70,art. 1.
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of effectuating these objectives, the Foodstuff Control Law required the Japanese
Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries to establish yearly plans that
address the prospects for the supply and demand of rice as well as the basic
method to be used to control the rice supply! 4 The Minister of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries also received authorization to modify the yearly basic plan
as necessary in order to react to changes in economic factors or supply and
demand shifts! 5 As a practical matter, Japan's traditional prohibition on rice
importation has helped Japan control its internal rice market and create a selfcontained and more manageable internal rice market free from foreign competition. 6
In order to further control its rice market, the purchase and sale of rice within
Japan's internal market has traditionally fallen completely under government
control 7 7 The Foodstuff Control Law stipulates that the producers of rice must
sell their rice to the government. 78 The only exception to this requirement is made
for quantities of rice which are sold by producers to parties, other than the
government, in accordance with government regulations. 9 The sale must also be
with the understanding that consumers are being supplied with rice in an efficient
manner that follows the Minister of Agriculture's plans for the years involved and
provides consistent inventories for consumer needsW
The government not only buys all of the rice from the rice producers, but it
also establishes the price at which it buys the rice from those producers. 8 1 The
Foodstuff Control Law requires the government to make the purchase price determination based on four factors! 2 Those factors include production costs,
commodity prices, and other economic conditions, maintaining continuity in the
production of rice and unforeseeable economic conditions that should be
considered.8
After buying the rice, the government is required under the Foodstuff Control
Law to sell the rice to licensed rice wholesalers in accordance with the plans

74. ld. art. 2(2).
75. Id. art. 2(3).
76. MATSUSHUA,supra note 2, at 47; see Schoenbaum,supra note 2, at 1180; Oreen, supranote 36.
at 152 (stating that imports constitute less than a fraction of one percent of Japan's annual rice consumption

of over ten million tons of rice).
77.

MATSUSHTrA & SCHOENBAUM, supranote 7, at 75.

78. Foodstuff Control Law, supranote 70, art. 3.
79. See generally id art. 3 (implying that rice producers may sell directly to parties in accordance with
government ordinances so long as it is done exactly the way the government would have conductrd the sale).
This appars to make this an exception only in who will supply the rice but not how it will be accomplished
or at what prices offered. Id.
80. Ld.art. 3.
81. MATSUSHITA &SCHOENBAUM, supranote 7, at 75; see Green, supra note 3l6, at 152 (stating that
the government sets the producer' prices to ensure acceptable income levels for rice farmers).
82. Foodstuff Control Law, supranote 70, art. 3:2.
83. ld art. 3:2.
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developed by the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries.! 4 The rice is
sold to distributors at a price that is also determined by the government. 5 The
formula to determine the selling price to the wholesalers focuses on the prevailing
level of household expenses, commodity prices and other economic conditions.
An important additional factor the government must consider when setting the
selling price is the goal of stabilizing the general consumers ordinary household
expenses!'
The practical effect of the government's control over the rice market, in an
attempt to meet the objectives of the Foodstuff Control Law, is that the government typically buys rice at ten times the world market price and sells it to
distributors at a much reduced price. 88 Although this procedure may prove economically inefficient, the policy is credited with helping farmers maintain a
steady income and keep rice farming viable.8 9 The Foodstuff Control Law
embodies the traditional method through which Japan has effectuated the general
policies of the Agricultural Basic Law.90
IV. ARTICLE M OF THE GATT AND How JAPAN'S RICE IMPORT RESTRICTIONS
CONFLICr
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,91 of which Japan is a primary
contracting country, has been referred to as the world's preeminent source of
international trade law. 2 Article XI of the GATT provides for the elimination of
quantitative trade restrictions between GAIT member countries.9 3 The practical
effect of Article XI is to prohibit the GATT contracting countries from imposing
prohibitions and restrictions on the importation of any product from a fellow

84. Id.art.4:1.
85. MATSUSITA & SCHOENBAUM. supranote 7, at 75; see Foodstuff Control Law, supra note 70, art.
4:2 (explaining that rice is sold to producers at a price determined by the application of government ordinance).
86. Foodstuff Control Law, supranote 71, art. 4:3.
87. Id. art. 4:3.
88. Burgess, supra note 10, at GI.
89. Id. (explaining that it is the rice import ban that has enabled rice farming to survive in Japan and
it is also the rice import ban that has produced the internationally envied income equality between farms and
cities in Japan); see Green,supranote 36, at 153 (explaining that government transfers and subsidies were over
three billion dollars per year during the mid-1980's); see also Burgess, supranote 10. at GI (stating that the
Japanese taxpayers subsidized the rice farmers close to four billion dollars per year as a result of government
supports and services).
90. See generally Foodstuff Control Law, supranote 70 (establishing the objectives and methodology
used to meet those policy requirements set forth in the Agricultural Basic Law for rice).
91. GA'ITsupranoteS.
92. Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 1167 (explaining that the GATr is much more than a trade
organization and actually represents a tremendous amount of international trade law); see generally GAIT
supra note 5 (establishing the trade regulations that have been accepted by over 100 countries and which
constitute much of the world's international trade law).
93. See GAIT, supranote 5, art. XL
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contracting country or the exportation of any product destined for a fellow GATIE
contracting country. However, Article XI does provide exceptions to the total
elimination of quantitative restrictions. 95

Article XI:2(c) specifically excludes agricultural products from the general
application of Article X and allows the continuation of agricultural quantitative
restrictions so long as the import restrictions fall into one of two categories." The
first category allows quantitative restrictions if the restriction is also effective97
against like domestic products produced in the country enforcing the restriction.

The second category of quantitative restriction of agricultural products not prohibited by Article XI involves restrictions that have been initiated to remove a

temporary surplus of a like domestic product which is the same or similar as a
product against which the restriction is enforced. 8

Historically, Japan's basic trade policy for rice has completely prohibited any
importation. 99 Because Japan was not promoting a program to decrease domestic
rice production or reduce a temporary rice surplus, Japan did not properly meet

the criteria set forth in Article XI, section 2(c) that must be satisfied before the
GATT contracting countries may utilize quantitative restrictions to limit or pro-

hibit the importation of agricultural products.W In 1987, after intense pressure
was applied by the United States through the GAT7's formal complaint process, t01 a GATr panel investigated Japan's policies concerning many agricultural
products, including rice.'02 The panel handed down a decision confirming that

94. GATT, supra note 5, art. XI:I; see Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 1167; MATSUSHITA, supranote
2, at 178; Jeffrey J. Steinle, The ProblemChild of World Trade: Reform School ForAgriculture,4 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 333,345 (1995).
95. See GAT, supra note 5, art. XI:2 (listing the exceptions to the total elimination of quantitative
restrictions required under Article XI:1 which include: (a) export restrictions or prohibitions that are
temporarily applied in response to critical shortages of food or other products essential to the exporting
country; (b) import or export restrictions that are necessary for the proper clarification, grading or marketing
of commodities in international trade; (c) import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries product necessary
to enforce government measures which operate to: (1) restrict the domestic production of the same or similar
product, (2) remove temporary domestic surplus of the same or similar product, or (3) restrict the production
of animal products, the production of which is dependant on the imported commodity and domestic production
of that commodity is low).
96. GATT, supra note 5, art. XI:2(c); see Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 1165, 1167; MrsUsHrr,
supranote 2, at 181.
97. See GAT17, supra note 5, art. XI:2(c)(i).
98. GAT, supranote 5, art. XI:2(c)(ii); see Schoenbaum, supranote 2, at 1167; MATSUsHITA, supra
note 2, at 181.
99. MATSUSHITA, supranote 2, at 47; Schoenbaum, supranote 2, at 1180.
100. See MATSUSHITA, supranote 2, at 180 (discussing the reason why the GAWT panel found Japan's
rice importation ban violated Article XI); see generally GAIT, supranote 5, art. XI:2(c) (listing the exceptions
to the elimination of quantitative restrictions which Japan's total ban on rice fails to meet).
101. See GATT, supra note 5, art. XXIII (describing the process that should be followed when one
contracting country believes that another contracting party is failing to meet its obligations under the GAlI).
102. MATSUSHITA, supra note 2, at 180; see Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 1171; MATSUStiITA &
SCHOENBAUM, supranote 7, at 76.
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Japan was in violation of Article XI on twelve items, one of which was rice, and
holding that Japan failed to meet its obligation as a contracting country of the
GAT'. 0 3The Japanese government accepted the panel's decision and proceeded

to eliminate the import quotas on beef and pork products, fruit puree and paste,
fruit pulp and canned pineapple, non-citrus juice, tomato ketchup and sauce,
glucose and miscellaneous processed foods.'04 However, the Japanese govern10 5
ment refused to eliminate quotas on dairy products and starch, including rice.
Japan's refusal to compromise on its rice policy hinges on the desire to
maintain self-sufficiency in the production of its main staple food.' 6 Buttressed
by multi-billion dollar subsidies, government purchases and a maze of
agricultural laws, Japan has successfully avoided becoming dependant on foreign
rice producers. 0 7 Another factor contributing to Japan's historic refusal to
eliminate its import ban on rice has been the long time political support voiced for
keeping the traditional rice import ban in place!0H However, on December 13,

1993, Prime Minister Morihiro, in the face of tremendous internal political
opposition, decided to bend to international pressure and agreed to open Japanese
markets to rice imports. 9
V. THE AGREEMENT ACcEPTED BY JAPAN

The agreement Japan accepted is a minimum access plan prepared by
Germain Denis, head of the GATr's market opening negotiation group."0 The

103. MATSuStrrA, supra note 2, at 180, see Schoenbaun, supra note 2, at 1171; MATSusHTA &
SCHOENBAUM, supranote 7, at 76.
104. MATSUSH1TA, supranote 2, at 180; MATsusHrA &ScHOENBAuM, supranote7, at 76.
105. MATSUsHIrA &ScHOENBAUM, supranote 7, at 77.

106. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (explaining that Japan believes maintaining selfsufficiency in rice production is a national safety issue and discussing Japan's desire to avoid falling victim
to embargos).
107..See Burgess, supranote 10, at GI (discussing the complicated system Japan has used to maintain
self-sufficiency in rice production); see generally Green, supranote 36, at 153 (stating that total transfers into
Japan's rice sector by the government between 1982 and 1986 were over fourteen billion dollars which
represents a producer subsidy equal to eighty-eight percent).
108. See supranotes 42-48 and accompanying text (discussing the political influences that have greatly
impacted the maintenance of Japan's rice import ban).
109. Reid, supranote 12, at AI9; HosokawaAnnounces Decision To Open JapanTo Rice Imports,supra
note 11, at 2082; see generallyMATSUSHrTA &SCHOENBAUM, supranote 7, at 77 (explaining that the United
States had not acted on the U.S. Rice Miller's Association's complaint, under section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974 (demanding retaliation against Japan, and was waiting to see if Japan took steps to open its rice market).
This threatening posture of U.S. trade retaliation appears to have been at least one of the factors pressuring
Japan to make concessions on its rice ban. L.
I10. Hosokawa Announces Decision To Open JapanTo Rice Imports, supra note 11, at 2082; see
generally HosokawaSays FonnalAnnouncementOn Rice Imports Will Be Made This Week, Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA), Dec. 8, 1993. at 2055 (implying that the GATr Contracting Parties employed the aid of a special group

of negotiators to work with Japan on market access issues concerning rice).
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Denis minimum access plan is comprised of four essential parts."' The first
portion of the plan imposes a six year moratorium on the conversion of non-tariff
trade barriers, like quotas or bans, into tariffs for farm products whose imports
comprise less than three percent of domestic consumption, whose exports are not
subsidized, and whose production is regulated domestically." 2 The second key
aspect of the plan is that rice receives special treatment on the condition that
Japan allows minimum access for imports of between four percent and eight
percent of domestic rice consumption to imports during the six year moratorium
period." 3 The third element calls for negotiations one year before the end of the
114
six year period to determine if the special treatment of rice will continue
Finally, countries wishing to restrict food exports during domestic food shortages
will be required to hold consultations with importing countries." 5

To honor the requirements of the Denis plan, Japan agreed to a six year
gradual opening of its rice import market, starting in 1995, that would allow rice
imports in Japan to steadily climb to eight percent of domestic rice consumption

at the sixth year of the implementation of the agreement.11 6 After the sixth year,
the quotas will be replaced by stiff tariffs that will gradually be reduced and
further open Japan's rice market under a system of comprehensive
"tariffication."117 The system of tariffication is an important aspect of Japan's
concession because it helps protect Japan's rice farmers from an immediate and

overwhelming entry of less expensive foreign rice into Japan's market.18

Japan's acceptance of the agreement to gradually open its rice market, at the
final moments of the Uruguay Round GATT negotiations, was a crucial part of
the events that lead to the passage of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agri-

culture that was subsequently accepted by the GAIT contracting countries. 19 The

111. See Hosokawa Says FormalAnnouncement On Rice Imports Will Be Made This Week, supra note
110, at 2055 (dividing the Denis plan into four separate parts).

112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Hosokawa Announces Decision To Open Japan To Rice Imports, supra note 11, at 2082
(explaining that the Denis plan accepted by Japan requires an initial entry of imported rice equal to 4% of

Japan's total rice consumption which will move up to eight percent by the year 2000); Reid, supra note 12,
at A19; Holley, supranote 12. at World Report 8; Rafferty, supra note 30, at 14.
117. HosokawaAnnounces Decision To Open JapanTo Rice Imports, supra note 11, at 2082; Reid.
supranote 12,at A19; see Watanabe, supranote 11, at DI (explaining that the tariff portion of the agreement
will be negotiated at the close of the six year period that Japan has to gradually open its rice market); Holley,
supra note 12, at World Report 8 (describing the system of monetary penalties Japan will be able to enforce
against rice imports after the six year quota period is complete); WEBsmT's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL

DIcrnoNARY 2341 (1976) (defining tariffication as a schedule, system or scheme of duties or fees imposed by
agovernment on imported or exported goods for the production of revenue or the artificial fostering of home
industries).
118. Rowley, supranote 11. at 29.
119. Telephone interview with William Huffman, Director of Public Relations. Farmers Rice
Cooperative (Dec. 21, 1995).
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Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture is an important agreement because it
addresses, among other things, the very market access issues that were a
tremendous point of contention between Japan and rice exporting countries like
the United States.' ° The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture negates the
agricultural exceptions originally placed in Article XI: 2(c) of the GATT and as
a result applies the principles set forth in Article XI by requiring contracting
countries to convert all import and market access restrictions into ordinary customs duties and tariffs.12 ' These measures are preferred under the GAIT because
they are more negotiable as compared to restrictions or prohibitions 2

VI. RECENT POST-AGREEMENT CHANGES IN JAPAN'S RICE LAW
In response to what the Japanese government has declared to be the vital need
of Japan to ensure a stable supply of staple food'2 under the new international
trade rules, Japan abolished the Foodstuff Control Law and instituted The Law
for Stabilization of Supply-Demand and Price of Staple Food (Staple Food

Law). 124
A. The Staple FoodLaw
The general objectives of the Staple Food Law are very similar to those set
forth in the Foodstuff Control Law.'2 5 The Staple Food Law aims to stabilize the
supply and demand as well as prices of rice, wheat and barley, thereby enhancing
the stability of Japanese citizen's lives as well as the national economy.'2 To
meet the basic policy of the Staple Food Law and ensure the stabilization of
120. See Agreement on Agriculture, openedfor signatureApril 15, 1994, in URUGUAY ROUND, FINAL
TECTS OFTHEGAITURUGUAYROUND AGREMENth INCLUDINGTHE AGREEMENTESTABLISHING THEWORLD

TRADE ORGANIZATION, art. 4:2 [hereinafter Agreement on Agriculture]; see also Steinle, supranote 94, at 344;
see generally LAW AND PRACICE oF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANEzTioN, COMMENTARY (Oceana 1995)
(giving a general overview of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture).
121. See Steinle, supranote 94, at 345; CompareAgreement on Agriculture, supranote 120, art. 4 with
GAIT, supranote 5, art. XI:2(c).
122. See Steinle, supranote 94, at 345; Compare Agreement on Agriculture, supranote 121, art. 4 with
GAT, supranote 5, art. XI:2(c).
123. See JAPAN INTORNATioNALAGRICULTuRAL COUNCIL FOR THE FOOD AGENCY, AN OUTLINE FOR
THE STABILIZATION OF SUPPLY-DEMAND AND PRICE OF STAPLE FOOD 8 (1995) [hereinafter OUTLINE OFTHE

STAPLE FOOD LAW] (defining staple foods as rice, wheat and barley or processed foods made from rice, wheat
or barley).
124. Shuyo Shokuryo no Juyo oyobi Kakaku no Antei ni Kansum Ho, Law No. 113, Dec. 14, 1994
[hereinafter Staple Food Law]; see OUTLINE OF THE STAPLE FOOD LAW, supra note 123, at 1 (explaining
Japan's belief in the need to meet international trade rules while ensuring a stable supply of staple food and
the decision to abolish the Food Control Law)
125. Compare Staple Food Law, supranote 124, art. I with Foodstuff Control Law, supranote 70, art.l.
126. Staple Food Law. supranote 124, art. 1; see OtIruNEOFTHESTAPLEFOOD LAW, supranote 123,
at 7 (discussing the purpose of the Staple Food Law and the important position that rice, wheat and barley
occupy in Japanese agriculture).
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supply, demand and the price of rice, the Minister of Agriculture establishes and

publicly announces a yearly plan. 27 The plan focuses on the implementation of
production adjustments to balance the supply and demand of rice, rice stockpile
management to guard against shortages, and a rice distribution system that will

meet consumer needs.12
In order to strengthen Japan's rice farning industry through producer
initiative, the government has broken away from its absolute control embodied
in the Foodstuff Control Law and, under the Staple Food Law, has greatly deregulated the distribution of rice by abolishing the historic obligation of rice farmers

to sell rice directly to the government. 29 Instead of requiring direct sales to the
government, the government requires rice farmers to sell their rice through less
restrictive, specified channels' 3° that meet the government's priority of ensuring
stable rice distribution. Rice producers now have the option of selling or
consigning their rice either to registered shippers or to the government, depending

on the production adjustments and quantity of rice allocated by the Minister of
Agriculture to be sold to the government by each producer under the yearly
plan. 32 The Staple Food Law is flexible in that it allows rice producers to apply

to the Minister of Agriculture to have their individual production adjustments
modified. 133 So long as the proposed modifications will not hinder smooth rice
distribution, the applications will be accepted."3
The purchase price and sale price of rice flowing into and out of the government is controlled by guidelines similar to those established under the Foodstuff

127. Staple Food Law, supra note 124, art. 4; see OtrrLINE OF'rHE STAPLE FOOD LAW, supra note 123,
at 9 (describing the requirement of an annual plan concerning the stabilization of the supply, demand and price
ofrice).
128. See OUrLiNEoFTHE STAPLE FooD LAw, supra note 123, at 2 (discussing the primary focus of the
yearly plan required under the staple food law); see supra notes 77-90 and accompanying text (discussing the
strict government control under the Foodstuff Control Law).
129. See generally OTLINEOFTHESTAPLEFOOD LAW, supra note 123, at2 (explaining the government
strategy of introducing market principles, promoting deregulation and pointing out a major move away from
absolute and direct government control in the rice market).
130. See i at 10 (outlining the specific channels through which rice producers may sell their rice which
include sale to government registered shippers, consignment to government registered shippers and sale to the
government).
131. See id at 2 (pointing out the abolition of some of the governments strict policies upheld under the
Foodstuff Control Law).
132. Staple Food Law, supra note 124, art.5; see OJThLDW OFTh ESTAPLE FOOD LAW, supra note 123,
at 10 (explaining the less restrictive channels through which rice farmers may now sell their rice).
133. See OtrrLNE OF THE STAPLE FOOD LAW, supra note 123, at 11 (discussing the ability of rice
producers to modify the government plan).
134. See generally id at I1 (pointing out that the Minister of Agriculture will accept the applications so
long as the goals of stabilizing the supply and demand ofrice are not jeopardized). It appears that the Minister
of Agriculture must accept applications for production adjustments and authorize them if the goals of the yearly
plan are not negatively impacted. Id.
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Control Law.135 However, under the Staple Food Law, the Minister of Agriculture
determines the government purchase price of rice not only by considering

production conditions and commodity prices, but also the price of rice sold to, or
consigned to, registered shippers.3 The sale price of rice sold by the government

to registered wholesalers is determined after taking into account trends in the
supply and demand of rice, household spending,
commodity prices, and the need
37
to stabilize consumers' household economy.1

To help stabilize the price of rice bought and sold through registered shippers
on the greatly deregulated, non-government market, the government established

an agency called The Voluntary Marketed Rice Price Formation Center.138 The
Voluntary Marketed Rice Price Formation Center buys and sells quantities of rice

to the degree necessary to manipulate supply and demand and create a "natural"
price index in the non-government market.

39 This

system allows the Japanese

government to somewhat deregulate much of the market while still indirectly
ensuring a stable and fair price for rice'

4°

Another important aspect of The Staple Food Law is its treatment of rice
imports and the government's ability to buy and price imported rice.14 ' The Staple
Food Law provides the government with the power to import rice under a special
method. This method requires a joint application of the entities intending to
import the rice and those qualified buyers, registered wholesalers and designated

government entities intending to purchase the imported rice.' 43 Furthermore, the
sale price for the imported rice will include duties, but the additional markups will

135. CompareFoodstuff Control Law, supra note 70, art. 3:2 with OUTLIN OFTHESTAPLE FOOD LAW,
supra note 123, at 18-19.
136. See OUTLINE oF tm STAPLE FooD LAw, supra note 123, at 18 (describing the methods the
government uses to determine the government purchase price from producers); see also Staple Food Law,
supra note 124, art. 59 (explaining that when deciding the government purchase price a specially designated
council must be consulted).
137. See OrTLINE OFTim STAPLE FooD LAW, supra note 123, at 19 (explaining the method used to
determine the price of rice sold by the government).
138. Staple Food Law, supranote 124, art. 48; see OUtLINE OFTHE STAPLEFOOD LAW, supranote 123,
at 2 (describing the government formation of the Voluntary Market Rice Price Formation Center in order to
ensure an index upon which fair prices can be based in the non-government market).
139. Staple Food Law, supra note 124, arts. 48-49; see generallyOtLINE OFTHE STAPLE FOOD LAw,
supra note 123, at 17-18 (establishing the methods that will be used by the Voluntary Marketed Rice Price
Formation Center when conducting business).
140. Staple Food Law, supranote 124, art. 48; see generally OUMNOFTHE STAPLEFOODLAW, supra
note 123, at 17 (explaining that the system has been put in place to insure smooth trading and appropriate
supplies of rice).
141. Staple Food Law, supranote 124, art. 60-61; see OUhLtNEOFTHMSTAPLEFOODLAW, supranote
123, at 19 (showing that Article 60 and Article 61 focus on the government's ability to buy imported rice and
how the imported rice will be priced).
142. OMtrINEOFESTAPLEFOOD LAW, supranote 123, at 20.
143. Staple Food Law, supranort 124, art.62; see OtLrL!NEOFTHESTAPLEFOOD LAW, supra note 123,
at 20 (describing the special method to be followed concerning rice importation).
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not exceed those levels determined by the Minister of Agriculture in compliance
with Japan's international commitments. 44
VII. EFFWT ON UNITED STATES RICE EXPORTERS

The United States is a major rice producing country with exports surpassing
2,164,000 metric tons of rice annually.145The potential positive ramifications for
the United States are staggering when considering the possible results of opening
the rice market of a country like Japan; a country with a population exceeding
125,000,000t4 that traditionally eats rice with every medf. Throughout the
Denis minimum access plan negotiations, while the United States was placing
intense pressure on Japan to open Japanese rice markets, the Japanese government
argued that the United States would not benefit from the lowering of the rice
import barriers. 48 Japan contended that the low cost rice producers, such as
business. 149

Thailand and Burma, would be the primary beneficiaries of the new

Although Thailand won several of the Japanese rice contract bids and has benefitted from the initial opening of Japan's market, the United States secured the

majority of the successful bids.s ° Statistics from April 1, 1995 through March 31,
1996, which is the first year of Japan's implementation of the GATT Agreement,
show that the United States has captured the majority of rice bids accepted by
Japan.15 1 To date, in the face of competition from Australia, China, Thailand,
Pakistan and Uruguay, the United States has obtained fifty-five percent of all rice
bids awarded by Japan.
The two biggest threats that may derail the potential boom for the United
States and all other rice exporting countries, resulting from the opening of Japan's
rice market, include possible delays in Japan's legal reform and potential bad

144. Staple Food Law, supranote 124, art. 61; see OutLTNEOFTHESTAPLEFOODLAW, supra note 123,

at 19-20 (explaining the pricing method to be used to determine the sale price of imported rice).
145. Tm WoRD ALMANAc AND BOOK OFFACTS, supranote 1, at 202.
146. Id. at 789.
147. REISCHALUR, supra note 32, at 21; see Green, supranote 36, at 152 (stating that rice is a staple in
the Japanese diet that.accounts for a substantial share of the average Japanese citizen's daily caloric intake).
148. See Burgess, supranote 10, at GI (discussing Japan's argument that the United States would not
benefit due to low cost Asian producers and that the United States budget deficit will be worsened if Japan
buys U.S. rice because U.S. rice is so heavily subsidized).
149. Id.

150. See Telephone Interview with Mathew I Massaua, supra note 14 (explaining that the United States
has won a majority ofthe contracts with Japan based on the quality of U.S. rice as well as the political position
the United States holds as Japan's most important ally).
151. See id (explaining that Japan is required to import 379,000 metric tons of rice in year one which
increases to 758,000 metric tons by the year 2000 and noting that the United States has won a majority of the
bids and is expecting to win more bids as the Japanese place additional orders prior to the March 31, 1996
deadline in order to meet the Denis plan's first year obligations); see Holley, supranote 12, at World Report
8 (discussing the minimum rice tonnage Japan is required to import in 1995).
152. Telephone Interview with Mathew J. Massaua, supra note 14.
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faith tariffication.13 Many believed that reforming Japan's Foodstuff Control Law
would present tremendous problems to the implementation of the full force of the
Uruguay Round Agreement.' 4 Recent history shows that Japan, by enacting the
Staple Food Law, acted quickly and did what many felt would not, or even could
not, be accomplished.3 5 By replacing the Foodstuff Control Law, Japan made
major strides in its commitment to slowly deregulate its internal rice market and
fulfill its international obligations under the GAT. 56
58
The second major threat is the bad faith use of tariffs. '5 Dirty tariffication1
has been, and continues to be, a realistic concern of those countries working to
open Japan's rice market. 59 Once the six year quota period moves into tariffication, the tariffs could easily be used to limit market liberalization of Japan's
rice market, and offer, for all practical purposes, only a relatively small percent
of the rice market to imports while maintaining control of the rest in an effort to
ensure stable rice prices that have been an historic Japanese emphasis.'60 The use
of tariffs to impede the dismantling of the protective effects of quotas and import
bans is possible because tariffs that are set at high levels result in imported goods
with artificially inflated prices that often force the imported goods out of the
market. 161Although Article XXVIII bis of the GATT specifically discusses and
recognizes that duties often constitute serious obstacles to trade, it does not
impose a per se limit on duties. 162 Instead, Article XXVIII bis provides the framework for negotiations to reduce tariff Ievels.'6 An important point to note, however, is that Article XXVIII bis, section 3 specifically states that all negotiations

153. See Michiyo Nakamoto, JapanResigned to Rice Liberalization:Even Once-vociferous Farmers
Are Now Ready to Swallow UruguayRound Reform, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1994, at7 (explaining that political
trouble and impediments to legal reform are a potential problem); Steinle, supra note 94, at 349 (discussing
how tariffs that are intentionally high often nullify market opening attempts).

154. Nakamoto, supra note 153, at 7.
155. See Nakamoto,supranote 153, at 7 (addressing the difficulty Japan faces in revising the Foodstuff
Control Law which may impede the impact of the Uruguay Round concessions by Japan).
156. See generally Staple Food Law, supra note 124; OuTiNE OFTHE STAPLE FooD LAW, supra note

123 (evidencing major legal reform that provides significant changes to the Foodstuff Control Law's absolute
restrictions and regulations).
157. See Steinle, supranote 94, at 348-49 (explaining that overstated tariffs are a great impediment to
trade liberalization and market access provisions).
158. See fit at 348 (defining "dirty tariffication" as the overstatement of tariffs to the point that they are
so high that market forces cannot work and trade liberalization is, as a practical matter, thwarted).
159. See id. at 348.49 (implying that dirty tariffication is not uncommon and is an effective means of

inhibiting trade liberalization methods).
160. See id.at 349 (explaining that high tariffs leave little room for the natural function of market forces
and prevent significant market liberalization); see also Rafferty, supranote 30, at 14 (explaining that during

the initial periods of tariffication, the rice import tariffs could be as high as seven hundred percent).
161. See Steinle, supra note 94, at 348-49 (explaining in general terms the depressing effect that high
tariffs can have on market liberalization and the seeming frequency with which many countries have used
tariffs to limit market access).
162. GATr', supra note 5, art. XXVIII bis.
163. Id.
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shall be conducted while keeping in mind several factors including the strategic
and particular needs of a contracting country regarding the specific industry or
product at issue.'6 These particular GATT Article XXVHI bis provisions
certainly appear to give Japan bargaining strength due to the strategic importance
Japan places on its remaining self-sufficient in rice production.'65
VIII. CONCLUSION

Japan has taken tremendous strides within the past several years to liberalize
and open its rice market.'6 Japan is progressing towards fulfilling its obligation
to import 379,000 metric tons of rice in the April 1, 1995 through March 31, 1996
fiscal year.'However, it remains to be seen whether the enforcement of Article
XI of the GAIT and Japan's concessions to international pressure to open its rice
market will actually result in anything more than a token piece of Japan's rice
market being sacrificed for the sake of the survival of Japan's participation in the
GATT.' 6 It is certainly quite possible that although Japan may have been forced
to unlock the door to its market, the alternative means that do not violate the
GATT could be used to maintain Japanese dominance of its own rice market.'6
Although the opportunity developing in Japan for rice exporting countries may
quickly be subsumed by Thailand, Burma and other countries that are rapidly
becoming powers in the world agricultural market, there is little doubt that Japan
will continue to buy rice from the United States to help maintain amicable
relations with the United States.' 70 This appears likely not only because the

164. See id. art. XXVIII bis:3 (laying out the factors that should be considered during any tariff
negotiation process under Article XXVIII bis which include: (a) the needs of the individual country and
particular industries; (b) the needs of less developed countries for flexibility in the use of tariffs to assist in

economic development and (c) other relevant circumstances including fiscal, developmental and strategic needs
of the country).
165. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text (discussing Japan's public policy arguments in
support of maintaining its self-sufficiency in rice production).
166. Hosokawa Announces Decision To Open Japan To Rice Imports, supra note 11. at 2082; Reid,
supra note 30, at A19; Holley, supra note 12, at World Report 8.
167. Telephone Interview with Mathew J. Massaua, supra note 14; see Holley, supra note 12, at World

Report 8 (discussing the minimum rice volumes Japan is required to import under the agreement).
168. See Reid, supranote 12, at A19; Nakamoto, supranote 153, at 7; Steinle, supra note 94. at 349.
169. See supranotes 162-66 and accompanying text (discussing the GATr Article XXVIII and the use
of tariffs under the GATr).
170. See Reid, supra note 12, at A19 (discussing Japan's relationship with the United States and
implying that Japan needs to foster good relations with the United States).
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United States is Japan's primary ally, but also because the United States is the
largest market for Japanese goods.17 1 The real question that remains to be answered is how much control of its internal rice market will Japan really give up tofree market forces and outside rice exporters.
JamesR. Moore

171. See id.(stating that the United States is Japan's primary export market which is evidenced by the
fifty billion dollar U.S. trade deficit with Japan).

